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We investigate effects of priming and preference on frame of reference (FOR) selection in
dialog. In a first study, we determine FOR preferences for specific object configurations
to establish a baseline. In a second study, we focus on the selection of the relative or the
intrinsic FOR in dialog using the same stimuli and addressing the questions whether (a)
interlocutors prime each other to use the same FOR consistently or (b) the preference for
the intrinsic FOR predominates priming effects. Our results show effects of priming (more
use of the relative FOR) and a decreased preference for the intrinsic FOR. However, as
FOR selection did not have an effect on target trial accuracy, neither effect alone represents
the key to successful communication in this domain. Rather, we found that successful
communication depended on the adaptation of strategies between interlocutors: the more
the interlocutors adapted to each other’s strategies, the more successful they were.
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INTRODUCTION
Localizing an object with reference to another object is common in
natural language. For instance, consider the sentence “The book is
to the left of the chair.” It is ambiguous whether the book is at the
chair’s left or whether it is to the left of the chair as viewed from the
speaker’s perspective. In order to refer to these different perspec-
tives, frames of reference (FOR) are used. FOR are a set of axes that
parse space (Carlson, 1999) and can be considered as coordinate
systems that impose an orientation on the environment, people,
or objects. These coordinate systems have an origin constituted
by the point of intersection (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976), a
direction and an orientation (Logan and Sadler, 1996). Following
Levinson (1996, 2003), three different FORs can be distinguished
which differ with regard to their origin and the spatial relationship
they establish. The relative FOR establishes viewpoint-dependent
ternary spatial relationships. A description of the object configu-
ration in Figure 1 according to the relative FOR would be “The
plant is in front of the chair”; the spatial relationship comprises the
plant, the chair and the viewer. In the present study, the origin of
the relative FOR always lies in the viewer; the coordinate system is
thus oriented egocentrically and the spatial relationship comprises
the speaker’s viewpoint and two objects. In the case of the intrin-
sic FOR, the relationships are binary and viewpoint-independent.
The intrinsic FOR is used when the origin lies in the object itself
and the direction of the FOR is oriented according to the inherent
axes of the object (“The plant is next to the chair” in Figure 1).
The absolute FOR is based on environmental features such as grav-
ity or the cardinal directions and will not be considered in this
study.
Situations in which the relative and the intrinsic FOR can
be used interchangeably exhibit a high potential for ambigui-
ties. If both FOR are equally likely to be used and speakers
do not indicate which FOR they are using, the probability that
an interlocutor interprets the FOR correctly is at chance level.
Attempts to define preferences for specific FORs have led to
ambiguous results. The relative FOR, being perceptually available
and avoiding the extra computational effort needed for men-
tal rotation, has been considered predominant by some authors
(Linde and Labov, 1975; Levelt, 1982, 1989) whereas other authors
have claimed that the intrinsic FOR predominates (Miller and
Johnson-Laird, 1976) or is at least preferred (Carlson-Radvansky
and Irwin, 1993; Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky, 1996; Taylor
et al., 1999). This disagreement and the potential for ambiguities
has led to an extensive body of psycholinguistic investigations of
which factors contribute to the selection and processing of spatial
FOR, mostly using monolog studies. The factors identified range
from functional relations between objects (Carlson-Radvansky
and Radvansky, 1996) to motion characteristics (Levelt, 1984),
gravity (Friederici and Levelt, 1990), priming effects (Watson
et al., 2004; Carlson and Van Deman, 2008; Johannsen and
de Ruiter, 2013), scene type (Johannsen and de Ruiter, 2013),
and properties of the object configuration such as the rotation
of the reference object and the position of the located object
(Ziegler et al., 2012).
However, monolog studies do not allow us to investigate how
interlocutors deal with FOR ambiguities in dialog. Dialog differs
from monolog in that dialog “language use is really a form of
joint action” (Clark, 1996, p. 3) which suggests that FOR inter-
pretation in dialog requires that interlocutors coordinate FOR
selection in order to communicate successfully. Even though
there have been attempts to investigate spatial perspective tak-
ing involving an imagined interlocutor (Herrmann, 1988; Duran
et al., 2011), studies using real dialogs are rare. Perspective taking
between interlocutors who have different physical vantage points
and thus different perspectives on the same scene is not considered
in the present study, but interesting results can be found else-
where (e.g., Bürkle et al., 1986; Schober, 1993; Galati et al., 2013).
Watson et al. (2004) showed that dialog partners tended to align
on FORs, revealing a tendency to use the same FOR that their
interlocutor had previously used. This was interpreted as a case of
alignment resulting from priming effects. Pickering and Garrod
(2004, p. 173) claim that alignment is a key factor for successful
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FIGURE 1 | Reference object (armchair) rotated 90◦ with located object
"in front of it" (relative reference frame) or “to the left of it” (intrinsic
reference frame).
communication and results from priming which is “essentially
resource-free and automatic.” However, Watson et al. (2004) used
a confederate as one of their participants, and the confederate’s
utterances were scripted. Assuming that people do not merely
adopt the interlocutor’s strategies but rather mutually influence
one another in dialog, a confederate may not represent a natural
dialog counterpart. Thus, FOR selection in a real dialog with two
naïve participants may reveal different effects.
However, following the attempts to specify FOR preferences
(as described above), it has been shown that there is a general
preference for the intrinsic FOR in specific object configurations
(Ziegler et al., 2012). This study also demonstrated an effect of the
located object’s position with regard to the reference object’s FOR.
If the located object was positioned on the front/back axis of a
FOR, this made the selection of the respective FOR more probable.
Thus, these axis-dependent preferences may reduce variability in
FOR selection independent from priming effects. Furthermore,
the general preference for the intrinsic FOR may lead interlocutors
to establish a conceptual pact (comparable to conceptual pacts in
lexical choices as discussed by Brennan and Clark, 1996) and use it
consistently. However, in such cases, conflicts may arise from the
opposing impacts of priming and preference of FOR.
The interaction between preference andpriming effects has not,
to our knowledge, previously been investigated. We expect that if
automatic priming is a prevailing effect in conversation that leads
to FOR alignment (cf. Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Watson et al.,
2004), this should override FOR preferences. However, if FOR
preferences lead to conceptual pacts with regard to FOR selection,
this may override priming effects.
To investigate effects of preference and priming in dialog, we
developed a priming study in which pairs of naïve participants
described pictures of object configurations to each other. In each
round, one of the participants was the director, who described a
spatial configuration displayed on a monitor while the other par-
ticipant (matcher) had to choose between two displayed pictures.
While half of the stimuli only allowed the use of the relative FOR
(prime trials), the other half consisted of stimuli allowing the use
of the intrinsic FOR (target trials). After every two trials, the roles
changed and thematcher became director. Thus, hearing the inter-
locutor A use the relative FOR in the prime trial should, according
to the priming account, prime interlocutor B to select the relative
FOR in the target trial.
STUDY I: FOR PREFERENCES
In order to be able to separate preference from priming effects, we
conducted a study in which we determined FOR preferences for
specific object configurations as a baseline for comparisons.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
As described above, FOR preferences are highly dependent on the
context and object features. For this reason, we focused on objects
from a single category (furniture). Spatial verbal descriptions were
elicited in an online experiment in which participants were shown
pictures of object configurations and were instructed to define the
spatial relations by inserting spatial terms in gapped sentences.
Their FOR preferences served as a baseline in the dialog study.
Participants
244 participants were recruited by email invitation. Data from 34
participants had to be excluded (due to a cease of participation or
different native language), thus, data from 210 participants (168
women, 42 men) with a mean age of 24.1 years (ranging in age
from 7 to 72 years) were used for analysis.
Stimuli and design
Stimuli were pictures of object configurations and Ger-
man gapped sentences of the form “<located Object>
steht ______<reference object>.” (“<located Object> stands
______<reference object>.”). Thus, participants had to insert
a spatial preposition and an article to fill the gap. Pictures were
created using Sweet Home 3D, an architectural design software.
66 pictures were created, each consisting of a reference object
and a located object. Different orientations of the reference object
resulted from rotating it clockwise at angles of 90◦, starting at 0◦
(reference object faces the observer). The located object (a plant
or a stool) was placed in four different positions: relatively in
front of, to the left of, behind and to the right of the reference
object. This led to potential ambiguities in the descriptions of the
located object, as a reference object rotated by 90◦ and a located
object placed relatively in front could also be described as “next
to” using the intrinsic FOR (see Figure 1). Following Graf and
Herrmann (1989), we distinguished between vehicle (e.g., chair)
and opposite (e.g., shelf) objects that reveal differences in the
assignment of the intrinsic left/right axis according to their pre-
dominant use. Of the 66 pictures, 36 consisted of vehicle objects
(chair, armchair, sofa) in four different orientations (excluding
object configurations inwhich the intrinsic and relative FORswere
aligned) and 30 showed opposite objects (wardrobe, bookshelf,
chest of drawers). For the opposite objects, only the rotations 0◦,
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90◦, and 270◦ were used, as these objects are characteristically used
with their back to a wall. We distinguished between these object
categories in order to control for potential differences in FOR
selection.
The randomization procedure took reference objects and their
rotation as well as located objects and their positions into account.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited by email invitation, in which they
received a link to the online study. First, instructions and three
examples were given using objects distinct from those in the study.
Afterward, the participants were shown the stimuli and asked to
fill in the gaps of the sentences. The whole study comprised 66 tri-
als and lasted about 20 min. Participants could then enter a prize
draw for one of 10 prizes of 10 Euros.
RESULTS1
Assuming axis-dependent regularities in FOR selection,we investi-
gated the effect of object rotation and position of the located object
on FOR selection. Thus, the descriptions of the participants were
coded as using“relative FOR,”“intrinsic FOR,”or“other”(for cases
on which no FOR was used). Two rotations (90◦, 270◦) were used
for analysis to ensure a constant dissociation of FORs.
Statistical analyses were performed with R (R Core Team, 2013)
using the“lme4”package (Bates et al., 2011). Mixed-effects models
of logistic regression for binomially distributed outcomes (gener-
alized linear mixed models, GLMM) were used for the analysis of
FOR selection. Mixed-effects models are efficient for the analysis
of psycholinguistic data as they allow to include random effects
of subjects and items “effectively solving the ‘language as a fixed
effect fallacy”’ (Quené and van den Bergh, 2008, p. 413).
1Parts of these results have been published (Ziegler, Johannsen, Swadzba, de Ruiter,
and Wachsmuth, 2012)
Descriptions that did not use either FOR were excluded (1.37%
of the data). As we only used two rotations of the reference object,
the position of the located object was either on the relative or
on the intrinsic front/back axis of the reference object. In order
to investigate FOR preferences resulting from the position of the
located object, we fit a logistic mixed-effects model with posi-
tion of the located object as fixed effect, full random slopes, and
intercepts for subjects and items and FOR selection as depen-
dent variable. Positing the relative front position as intercept, we
found significant differences to all other positions (relative left,
i.e., intrinsic front/back position: β = 2.61, SE = 0.3, z = 8.66;
relative behind: β = −1.37, SE = 0.19, z = −7.05; relative
right, i.e., intrinsic front/back position: β = 2.02, SE = 0.36,
z = 5.68, all p < 0.001). These differences in FOR selection
resulting from the position of the located object are illustrated
in Figure 2. Please note that the relative positions “left” and
“right” coincide with the intrinsic front–back axis. Regularities
of FOR selection suggest an axis-dependent effect, potentially
comparable to the distinction between two forms of visuospa-
tial perspective taking (Flavell, 1986). Front/behind judgments are
easier to process than left/right relations as they do not require
a simulated rotation movement (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010).
Furthermore, this axis-effect stands in line with previous research
which has shown that the front/back axis is easier to access
than the left/right axis due to body asymmetries (Franklin and
Tversky, 1990). Additionally, we speculate that the differences
between relative “front” and “behind” (i.e., more relative FOR
selection when the located object is positioned behind the refer-
ence object) might result from the occlusion of the located object.
We assume that this occlusion might give more salience to the
relative FOR.
We controlled object category in the design in order to elimi-
nate effects of object category on FOR selection. However, when
we additionally posited object category as fixed effect in the same
FIGURE 2 | FOR selection in the first study.
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model, model comparison revealed no statistically significant
effect of object category. This indicates that FOR selection did
not differ between vehicle and opposite objects.
CONCLUSION
Our results reveal a general preference for the intrinsic FOR but
also significant effects of the position of the located object. Accord-
ingly, we are now able to differentiate between preferred choice for
the object configurations (i.e., the intrinsic FOR) and priming
effects.
STUDY II: PRIMING vs. PREFERENCE
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty four participants were paid volunteers in the experiment.
Due to experimenter error, two groups (four participants) had to
be excluded, thus data from 50 participants (11 male, 39 female)
ranging in age from 19 to 61 (M = 24.3, SD = 6.2) was used.
Stimuli and design
Using a priming paradigm, we constructed prime and target trials
in three conditions which only differed with regard to the prime
trials. We thus controlled the target trials within items. Altogether,
the experiment consisted of 144 prime-target pairs resulting from
three priming conditions for each of the 48 target pictures (3 prim-
ing conditions × 6 reference objects × 2 rotations × 4 positions
of LO).
The stimuli were pictures created with indoor planning soft-
ware (Sweet Home 3D). The pictures showed object configura-
tions, consisting of a reference object and a located object. For
the prime trials, three types of pictures were created (33 pic-
tures for each type): neutral, same position, and different position.
In the neutral pictures, both FOR were available and aligned as
the located object was positioned along the vertical axis of a
triaxial reference object. The other two types of pictures (same
and different position) comprised a biaxial reference object and
a located object which was positioned on one of the horizon-
tal axes. Accordingly, the intrinsic FOR was unavailable and the
FIGURE 3 | Example of prime-target pairs in three priming conditions.
participants had to use the relative FOR. In the same position con-
dition, the located object was at the same position in prime and
target trials (e.g., to the left of the reference object within the rel-
ative FOR, see Figure 3). In the different position condition, the
located object was placed at the opposite side of the reference
object than in the target trial (e.g., to the right of the reference
object in the prime trial and to the left of the reference object in
the target trial, both within the relative FOR). The same and differ-
ent position conditions were used to test whether priming effects
are stronger when the located object has the same position in
prime and target trial which would be a plausible consequence
of lexical priming, given that the same prepositions would be
used.
The pictures described in the first study (in 90◦ and 270◦ rota-
tion) were used as target stimuli. See Figure 3 for an example of
the three priming conditions using the same target trial.
Randomization took into account priming condition, the ref-
erence object and its rotation, and the position of the located
object. To counterbalance the sequential order, the experiment
was conducted in two versions by switching the order for half the
participants.
There were two roles for the participants that changed after
every two trials: the director and the matcher. The director was
shown a single picture of an object configuration and described
it to the matcher while the matcher was shown two pictures and
had to decide which of the two fitted the director’s description.
The matcher’s two pictures always showed the same reference
object at the same rotation as on the director’s screen. However,
the position of the located object differed so that the director’s
descriptions became potentially ambiguous with regard to FOR
in the target trials. Thus, if participant B (director) described the
target configuration in Figure 4 as “The plant is in front of the
chair,” either picture could plausibly be correct depending on the
matcher’s FOR interpretation. Interpreted within a relative FOR,
the picture on the left is correct; interpreted within the intrinsic
FOR, the picture on the right is correct. However, as only one of
the two pictures corresponded to the director’s picture, its choice
revealed whether participants successfully solved the problem of
ambiguity.
After every two trials, the roles changed so that the director
became the matcher and vice versa. Therefore, the description of
FIGURE 4 | Role change between participants.
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the previous director was used as the prime for the description
of the subsequent director. Thus, participants took it in turns to
prime each other. See Figure 4 for an example of a prime-target
sequence (in the subsequent target trial, participant A would have
been the director).
PROCEDURE
Two naïve participants participated together as interlocutors in
a dialog task. Each participant sat in front of a computer screen
on which the stimuli were displayed. Participants were separated
by a movable wall so that they were able to hear each other
but could not see each other nor the other’s computer screen.
At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions were
presented on the monitor, informing the participants about the
procedure of the experiment. Before the start of the study, partic-
ipants completed five test trials with stimuli distinct from those
used in the study. After that, they were asked if the task was
clear to them and if so, the study started. The director was
shown a single picture whereas the matcher saw two pictures.
The director immediately started describing the spatial configu-
ration. The matchers’ task was to determine which of the two
pictures matched the director’s description and respond by press-
ing predefined keys on a button box (left key for left picture,
right key for right picture). Accuracy ratings were measured
using E-Prime (Psychology Tools Software). The matcher was
also allowed to give feedback (e.g., ask the matcher for more
information, indicate ambiguities). Both participants’ pictures
remainedon the screenuntil a responsewas given. Thewhole study
comprised 288 trials (144 prime-target pairs) and lasted about
15 min.
The participants were unaware of the objective of the experi-
ment and of the type of trials they were completing. No feedback
was given during the experiment.
RESULTS
Data from 50 participants were used for analysis. Statistical analy-
sis was carried out in PASW Statistics 18 and in “R” (R Core Team,
2013) using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2011). Mixed-effects
models of logistic regression (generalized linear mixed models
for binomially distributed outcomes, GLMM) were used for the
analysis of FOR selection and accuracy.
Our statistical analysis considered FOR selection in the direc-
tor’s descriptions of target trial stimuli and the matcher’s accuracy.
Furthermore, we conducted a qualitative analysis of the lin-
guistic behavior in terms of the strategies used to disambiguate
descriptions. Rationales for each analysis are given in each section.
Priming of FOR in dialog
In order to investigate effects of priming or preference on FOR
selection, we analyzed the FOR selection in the director’s descrip-
tions. While a prevailing use of the relative FOR in target trials
would indicate priming effects, predominant use of the intrinsic
FOR would suggest effects resulting from FOR preference.
The director’s descriptions were transcribed and categorized
according to FOR use. For categorization, we used the first unin-
terrupted utterance of the speaker (cf. de Ruiter et al., 2012). In
some cases, participants used both FOR at the same time. These
descriptions were categorized as “ambiguous” (10.3% of the data).
Descriptions that did not use a specific FOR but rather referred
to the location of the object on the screen or the proximity of the
objects to the director were categorized as “other” (10.6% of the
data). Data that revealed participant’s error, for instance when the
matchers erroneously described what they saw, were also excluded
(0.17%). The rates of FOR selection in prime and target trials are
summarized in Table 1.
As Table 2 shows, the relative FOR was chosen more often
than the intrinsic FOR. This result was in contrast to the prefer-
ence for the intrinsic FOR in our first study. Thus, we compared
FOR choice between the two studies in order to analyze whether
the differences in FOR selection were statistically significant. We
fit a logistic mixed-effects model with study type (baseline vs.
dialog) as a fixed effect and random slopes and intercepts for
subjects and items. The results showed a significant main effect
of study type (β = −3.21, SE = 0.88, z = −3.67, p < 0.001)
confirming the difference in FOR selection between the two stud-
ies and revealing more use of the relative FOR in the dialog
study.
In the next step, we investigated whether FOR selection in the
dialog study had an effect on target trial accuracy. We assumed
that if priming or preference was a prevailing mechanism in order
to disambiguate FOR, there should be an effect of FOR selection
on target trial accuracy (as a measure for communicative success).
Thus, we fit a logistic mixed-effects model with FOR selection
as fixed effect and random slopes and intercepts for groups and
items. There was no significant effect of FOR choice on target trial
accuracy (β = −0.79, SE = 0.57, z = −1.39, p = 0.17).
Differences between priming conditions
As described above, we used three priming conditions (neutral,
same position, different position) in order to investigate whether
Table 1 | FOR selection and target trial accuracy.
FOR Prime trial (%)
(N = 3600)
Target trial (%)
(N = 3600)
Target trial accuracy
(% within FOR)
Relative 93.8 50 80.8
Intrinsic 0 29 71.8
Ambiguous 0.2 10.3 82.1
Other 4.7 10.6 97.4
NA 1.3 0.2 –
Table 2 | Differences in FOR index within and between groups.
Difference of index scores
Mean (SD) Min Max
Same group 0.18 (0.33) 0 0.97
Subsequent group 0.37 (0.4) 0 1
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priming effects are stronger when the located object has the same
position in prime and target trial. This would be a plausible conse-
quence of lexical priming, given that the same prepositions would
be used. Accordingly, we analyzed whether the three priming con-
ditions differedwith regard to FOR selection in the target trials.We
excluded “other” and “ambiguous” answers and error cases from
analysis.
Again, we fit a mixed-effects model of logistic regression posit-
ing priming condition as a fixed effect and using random slopes
and intercepts for groups and items. Using the neutral condition
as intercept, there was no significant effect of priming condition
(same position: β = −0.16, SE = 0.2, z = −0.82, p = 0.41; dif-
ferent position β = −0.39, SE = 0.23, z = −1.74, p = 0.08). This
reflects that the three conditions did not differ with regard to FOR
selection (relative or intrinsic) in the target trials. However, results
revealed a marginal difference between the neutral condition and
the different position condition.
Effects resulting from the position of the located object
As the first study had shown that the position of the located object
had a significant effect onFOR selection indicating axis-dependent
preferences, we analyzed whether this result was replicated in the
second study by fitting a mixed-effects model of logistic regression
(using only relative and intrinsic FOR descriptions in the target
trials). We posited position of the located object as a fixed effect
and used full random slopes and intercepts for groups and items.
Therewas a significantmain effect of positionof the located object.
Using the relative front position as intercept, there were significant
differences compared to position of the intrinsic front and back
(i.e., the relative left: β= 1.5, SE = 0.29, z = 5.19 and relative right:
β = 1.25, SE = 0.32, z = 3.88, both p < 0.001) but not compared
to the relative behind position. This indicates that there was a
higher amount of relative FOR use when the located object was
positioned along the relative front/back axis. Thus, we recoded the
positions of the located object in terms of axes so that we were able
to distinguish between the relative and intrinsic front/back axes.
We then fit a logistic mixed-effects model using axis as fixed effect
and randomslopes and intercepts for groups and items. The results
showed a significant effect of the axis (β= 1.26, SE= 0.28, z = 4.51,
p < 0.001, see Figure 5) revealing a greater use of the intrinsic FOR
FIGURE 5 | Effect of the axis position of the located object on FOR
selection.
when the located object was positioned on the intrinsic front/back
axis.
Variability in FOR selection within groups
We expected that participants within groups would adapt the same
FOR in order to facilitate mutual comprehension. Thus, we ana-
lyzed the variability in FOR selection within and between groups
by computing FOR indices (cf. Watson et al., 2006). These indices
reflect how similar the descriptions of the participants were with
regard to FOR selectionwithin groups, i.e., themore the interlocu-
tors used the same FOR, the lower the FOR index. The FOR indices
were computed for each participant by dividing the amount of
relative FOR descriptions by the sum of relative and intrinsic
descriptions (thus, the analysis excluded the categories ambiguous
and other). We subtracted the index from participant B from the
index from participant A and squared the result to avoid negative
numbers.
To test these within-group indices against indices that would
arise between random interlocutors, we subtracted the indices
between participants of subsequent groups. These indices from
participants that did not engage in a conversation and could not
influence each other reflect overall patterns that may arise by
chance (see Table 2). As the data were not normally distributed
(Shapiro–Wilk Test: both df = 25; index within groups S–W = 0.6;
index between groups: S–W = 0.78, both p < 0.001) we compared
the two values using Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and found a sig-
nificant difference (Z = −2.09, p < 0.05). The scores between
random interlocutors were significantly higher than the scores
within groups; this reflects that participants adapted to each other
and tended to use the same strategies, independent whatever the
specific choice of strategy involved.
In order to analyze whether the time course of the dialog led
to an increased adaptation of strategies between interlocutors,
we calculated sliding averages of the FOR indices within groups.
Considering a window of four target trials at a time, again, we
proceeded as described above for the computation of FOR indices
and, again, subtracted the FOR index of participant B from the
FOR index from participant A. By shifting the four-trial-window
one trial further at a time, we obtained averages that represented
how participants adapted their FOR over time. For illustration,
we chose three groups as examples (Figure 6) revealing different
degrees of adaptation (high, medium, and low) between inter-
locutors (the respective target trial accuracy for the three groups
is depicted in Figure 7).
Next, we assumed that a mutual adaptation of FOR reduced
misunderstandings thus leading to a more efficient communica-
tion (measured here as target trial accuracy). We analyzed whether
sliding average FOR indices within groups had an effect on target
accuracy. We fit a mixed-effects model of logistic regression with
target trial accuracy as dependent measure, FOR indices as fixed
effects and full random slopes and intercepts for groups and items.
We found a significant main effect of index scores (β = −1.38,
SE = 0.3, z = −4.68, p < 0.001). For an illustration of the rela-
tionship betweenoverall target trial accuracy andFOR index scores
within groups, see Figure 7 (case labels include group number and
overall target accuracy for the three exemplary groups depicted in
Figure 6).
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FIGURE 6 | Exemplary time course of difference scores for three
groups.
FIGURE 7 | Scatter plot of target accuracy and difference scores within
groups.
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In a qualitative analysis of the data, we investigated which qualita-
tive strategies interlocutors applied to resolve ambiguities in target
trials, considering only trials in which the relative or the intrin-
sic FOR were used. We analyzed the annotated dialog considering
more than the first uninterrupted utterance for additional strate-
gies to solve FOR ambiguities. Our analysis showed that additional
information for disambiguation was provided in 23.3% of the tar-
get trials by the director even though the matcher indicated that
the description was ambiguous with regard to the spatial FOR in
only 1.5% of the target trials.
However, 11 out of 25 groups did not provide any additional
information. Their results varied with regard to the matcher’s
accuracy (mean 78.8%, SD 30.6, ranging from 11 to 99%) and dif-
ference scores (mean 1841.7, SD 2690.5, ranging from 0 to 7448).
The other 14 groups varied in their strategies, although we could
classify three main approaches. The most common was a defini-
tion of the perspective (in 13.8%, e.g.,“In front of the chair, as seen
from my/the chair’s perspective”). Other strategies were reference
to specific intrinsic features of the object (8.3%, e.g., “The stool
is in front of the front of the couch”) or the use of specific verbs
(1.3%) to express the position of the located object (e.g., “The
plant disappears behind the sofa”). The latter was, however, only
used in trials in which the located object was positioned relatively
behind the reference object and was thus partly covered by it.
With regard to the quantity of strategies within each FOR, we
found that more additional strategies were used within the intrin-
sic FOR (39.7%) than within the relative FOR (13.4%). Within
the intrinsic FOR, 25.2% of the target trial descriptions contained
additional informationwith regard to theperspective (7.3%within
the relative FOR).
CONCLUSION
Our results reveal a general priming effect of the relative FOR
(as shown by the comparison between the two studies) and a sig-
nificant effect of the located object’s position on FOR selection.
There were, however, no significant differences between the three
priming conditions.
Furthermore, our results show that participants adapt each
other’s strategies (as shown by the comparison between intra-
vs. intergroup difference scores) and that target trial accuracy is
influenced by the extent of this adaptation.
With regard to qualitative strategies, we found that even though
FOR ambiguity was indicated in only 1.5% of the target trials,
participants added further information in about a third of the
target trials (27.8%). Strategies comprised perspective marking
(17.2%), the reference to intrinsic features of the reference object
(9.4%) or the use of verbs denoting a specific location (1.2%).
Strategies were used more often within the intrinsic FOR (39.9%)
than within the relative FOR (13.6%).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated effects of priming and pref-
erence on FOR selection in a dialog task. As the prime trials only
allowed a description using the relative FOR (i.e., the intrinsic FOR
was not available or both FOR were aligned), the priming account
would predict a prevailing use of the relative FOR in the target
trials (cf. Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Watson et al., 2004), even
though the intrinsic FOR was available. The comparison of FOR
selection (intrinsic vs. relative) between the first and the second
study revealed significant differences indicating greater use of the
relative FOR in the dialog study. This increase in the use of the
relative FOR might reflect priming effects in target trials result-
ing from processing the relative FOR in the preceding prime trial.
In any case, the preference for the intrinsic FOR, as found in the
first study, was diminished, which indicates that this preferences
cannot be considered robust and predominant (contra to Miller
and Johnson-Laird, 1976). Interestingly, the choice of FOR had
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no effect on target trial accuracy. In order to efficiently solve FOR
ambiguities, we would have expected that participants negotiated
which perspective should be used, comparable to a conceptual
pact (Brennan and Clark, 1996) with regard to the spatial FOR.
However, no group used this strategy and defined a consistent
perspective. This indicates that the groups must have used other
strategies.
Even though priming effects might explain the more frequent
choice of the relative FOR, we would like to discuss the role of
priming in communication. Priming leading to alignment has
been claimed to be the key to successful communication (cf. to
Pickering andGarrod,2004). In our study, the primed relative FOR
was used in target trial descriptions only half of the time. If prim-
ing was automatic and thus unavoidable, should we not expect a
greater frequency of relative FOR selection in target trials? Given
that half of the time, interlocutors did not use the primed FOR, the
role of priming as the prevailing mechanism in communication
might have been overestimated. Furthermore, FOR selection did
not have an influence on target trial accuracy. If both interlocutors
were primed to use the same FOR, this should be evident not only
in their spatial descriptions but also in their interpretations of the
other’s descriptions. Thus, our findings indicate that, even though
priming may have an influence on FOR selection in dialog, it may
not be as automatic and comprehensive as has previously been
assumed and does not necessarily lead to successful communica-
tion (measured here in terms of target trial accuracy; cf. Pickering
and Garrod, 2004).
Despite the fact that there was a general priming effect, there
were no differences between the three priming conditions (neu-
tral vs. same position vs. different position of the located object)
with regard to the FOR selection in the target trials. This sug-
gests two things: on the one hand, it did not matter whether
the relative position of the located object was the same in prime
and target trial. Thus, accessing single components of the rela-
tive FOR (i.e., the front/back axis) leads to an activation of the
whole FOR resulting in a priming effect in the subsequent trial.
As the intrinsic FOR was either not available or aligned with the
relative FOR in the prime trials, we can exclude an inhibition of
the FOR as reported by Carlson andVan Deman (2008). However,
due to the design of the experiment, our focus was on activation
of FOR, which limits our conclusions about the nature of inhi-
bition. On the other hand, the fact that there was no difference
in effects of FOR selection between the same vs. different position
condition reveals that there was no cumulative effect of lexical and
FOR priming, a result that supports findings previously reported
(Watson et al., 2004).
Independent of priming effects, we found effects on FOR selec-
tion resulting from the position of the located object in both
studies. If the located object was positioned on the front/back
axis of the FOR (relative or intrinsic), this made the choice of
the respective FOR more likely. This suggests a general prefer-
ence for localizing along the front–back axis and stands in line
with related work. With regard to the egocentric FOR, this result
coheres with the idea that the front/back relations are easier to pro-
cess, due to the inherent asymmetric features, than are left/right
relations, as has been reported before (e.g., Tversky, 1996). With
regard toperspective taking, fundamental differences inprocessing
the front/back compared to the left/right axis have been reported
(e.g., Kessler and Rutherford, 2010). Extending these findings with
regard to the intrinsic FOR, our results emphasize the impact of
the intrinsic front/back axis in spatial descriptions.
As we have shown that priming effects were less pronounced
than we would have expected from an automatic process and that
FOR selection did not have an effect on target trial accuracy, we
assumed that the groups developed their own strategies to resolve
FOR ambiguities. In order to investigate these strategies, we calcu-
lated difference scores within groups that represented how similar
the descriptions of the two interlocutors were and compared them
to difference scores that arose between random interlocutors. The
significant difference between the groups revealed that within
groups, interlocutors tended to adopt the same strategies, using
either the relative or intrinsic FOR, both FOR at the same time or
other descriptions which completely avoid spatial FOR. This indi-
cates that interlocutors adapted to each other, but not necessarily
by consistently using the primed relative FOR or the preferred
intrinsic FOR. The efficiency of this mutual adaptation of strate-
gies was measurable in terms of target trial accuracy: the more
interlocutors adapted each other’s strategies, the more accurate
they were. More generally speaking, this reveals that commu-
nicative success depends on mutual adaptation. A comparable
adaptation process of types of descriptions has been reported for
players in a maze-game (Garrod and Anderson, 1987). Further-
more, Schober (1993) found that pairs of interlocutors in dialog
varied idiosyncratically with regard to the perspective-setting
strategies they used in their descriptions of spatial configurations.
Under these conditions, a lot of variability between groups was
possible without impairing the ultimate success of communica-
tion. This variability is necessarily reduced in dialog studies in
which one of the interlocutors is a confederate. While the naïve
participant can adapt to the confederate’s strategies, the confed-
erate’s contributions are limited to scripted utterances. Thus, the
collaborative aspect of communication that arises from the fact
that “language use is really a form of joint action” (Clark, 1996,
p. 3) becomes a unilateral process. This reduction in variability
may explain why priming effects appear stronger in such studies.
Interestingly, there were five groups in our study that revealed
a very low level of adaptation (i.e., very high difference scores)
and a target trial accuracy equal to or below 56%. The low per-
centage of accuracy reveals that interlocutors misunderstood each
other about half of the time (or even more often for lower num-
bers). By taking a closer look at the strategies of each participant,
we found that all five groups showed the same pattern: one of
the participants predominantly used the relative FOR whereas the
other participant used the intrinsic FOR. This pattern may reflect
individual preferences, as pointed out by Levelt (1982). Given that
the experiment did not include feedback with regard to accuracy
and that both target pictures could possibly be correct within dif-
ferent FOR interpretations, participants obviously did not realize
that they used different FOR throughout the dialog. We avoided
including feedback in order to allow participants to develop their
own strategies for dealing with the problem of FOR ambiguity and
to keep the dialog as natural as possible. Thus, misunderstandings
resulting from different FOR interpretation may be common in
natural language (20% of the groups experienced this problem).
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Following this idea, we investigated the time course of dialog
with regard to difference scores. When plotting the cumulative
sum of these scores over the trial sequence, the slope of the result-
ing curve depends on the difference score: the higher the score,
the steeper the curve. In general, groups that revealed a high
level of adaptation showed a low slope of the resulting curve
whereas groups that adapted each other’s strategies to a lesser
extent revealed a steeper curve. Taking three groups as examples
that differed with regard to their target trial accuracy, we found
that the more successful the group was (i.e., in maintaining overall
high target trial accuracy), the lower the difference scores remained
over time, indicating a constantly high level of strategy adaptation
(see, group 10). As expected, the opposite pattern was found in
unsuccessful groups (i.e., revealing overall low target accuracy)
that showed high difference scores throughout the dialog, reflect-
ing that participants consistently used different strategies. Group
12 (Figure 6), for example, showed this opposite pattern: con-
stantly high difference scores arose due to different descriptions
strategies between interlocutors, leading to a steep increase of the
curve over time and low target trial accuracy (15.3%). Group
14 can be considered as being moderately successful with a tar-
get accuracy of 55.6%. Note that this percentage indicates that
participants misunderstood each other nearly half of the time.
However, even though we can conclude that mutual adapta-
tion of strategies seems to be strongly facilitating communicative
success, an open question remains why some groups showed high
levels of adaptation while other groups did not adapt at all. This
question cannot be answered unambiguously but theremay be two
explanations. Haywood et al. (2005) have shown that speakers in a
dialog study were sensitive to the ease of comprehension for their
interlocutor, disambiguating their descriptions in visually ambigu-
ous contexts. Thus, on the one hand, the lack of disambiguation in
someof the groups in our study could reveal that participants erro-
neously assumed they were successful because they failed to notice
the potential ambiguity. This stands in linewith the claim that peo-
ple are normally not aware of the fact that there are two alternative
FOR (Grabowski and Miller, 2000, p. 526). On the other hand,
we cannot exclude that participants may have deliberately chosen
not to adapt to each other’s strategies, for instance due to a lack of
motivation for solving the task successfully. Thus, collaboration
may well be a prerequisite for successful communication.
In a final step, we investigated the dialogs for qualitative
strategies. Qualitative strategies consisted of explicitly adding a
perspective to the FOR (e.g., “[...] as seen from my/the chair’s per-
spective” or “[...] if you sit in the chair”), reference to intrinsic
features of an object (e.g., “The plant is behind the backrest of the
chair”), or the use of specific verbs (e.g., “The plant disappears
behind the chair”). Qualitative strategies were used in nearly one
third of the descriptions in addition to the intrinsic or relative
FOR. The use of these strategies suggests that the director was
aware of the ambiguity problem and tried to help the matcher by
adding unambiguous information to resolve it. The fact that this
was done quite often may result from the role switching in the dia-
log. As both interlocutors were confronted with FOR ambiguities
when they were the matcher, they were aware of the problem when
they were director.
Interestingly, about a quarter of the descriptions within the
intrinsic FOR contained information about the perspective and
thus the Origo of the FOR. This stands in contrast to what has
been assumedbyGrabowski andMiller (2000, p. 521)who claimed
that“the entity that constitutes theOrigo is never expressed explic-
itly in the case of intrinsic relations.” By contrast, the infrequent
addition of explicit perspective in trials in which the relative FOR
was used is surprisingly small given the prediction that “[...] if a
deictic2 interpretation is intended when an intrinsic interpreta-
tion is possible, the speaker will usually add explicitly ’from my
point of view’ [...]” (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 398).
We assume that giving information on the Origo depends on the
speaker’s confidence about the listener’s interpretation of the FOR
and can be interpreted in terms of the Gricean maxims of con-
versation (Grice, 1975). If both interlocutors have adopted the
same FOR consistently, mentioning the Origo would violate the
Griceanmaximof quantity andmake the contributionmore infor-
mative than required (Grice, 1975, p. 308). However, when there
is no such agreement on a specific FOR, providing no informa-
tion on the Origo disregards the maxim of manner, i.e., avoiding
ambiguity. Thus, we suggest that adding perspective reflects the
speaker’s degree of certainty of the listener’s FOR interpretation
independent of the type of FOR being used.
In conclusion, our results show that neither FOR preferences
nor priming alone represent the key to successful communication
in this domain. Intrinsic FOR preferences (as shown in the first
study) were partly diminished by priming effects in the dialog
study. However, priming effects could only account for half of the
FOR selection in target trials. As groups varied widely with regard
to their description strategies, priming of FOR leading to an align-
ment of situation models (Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Watson
et al., 2004) does not provide a comprehensive account of success-
ful communication. Rather, successful communication seems to
depend on the adaptation of strategies between interlocutors: the
more the interlocutors adapted to each other’s strategies, the more
successful they were.
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